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Abstract
Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are simple circuits that are ideal for hardware
security. Typically, they are used for identifying and authenticating integrated circuits
(ICs). In this work, we are interested in a class of delay based PUFs which mainly consist
of multiplexers. They are known as multiplexer-based PUFs or MUX PUFs, for short.
We are interested in modelling their structure and then, analyzing their performances.
Our work can be mainly divided into some key contributions. First, we discuss about
the different types of MUX PUFs that we deal with in this work. They are the simple
or linear configuration, feed-forward configuration and modified feed-forward configu-
ration. We then, present a typical scheme used for the authentication of these PUFs.
However, much of the work concentrates on a modified version of the authentication
scheme, where instead of storing a look-up table (LUT) of challenge-response pairs
(CRP) in the server, we store a set of delay parameters corresponding to the physical
attributes of the MUX PUF. These stored parameters are the delay-differences of the
MUX stage and the arbiter delay. We show that MUX PUFs can be modelled using an
additive linear delay model. The additive model helps in the computation of an impor-
tant parameter, known as total delay-difference. Based on the total delay-difference, we
can compute two different versions of the output or response: hard-response, which is
either a ‘0’ or ‘1’ bit and soft-response, which can take continuous values between 0 and
1. We formulate models for obtaining both these responses. Various metrics used for
the evaluation of PUF performance are discussed. The general lab setup used to collect
the required PUF data is also discussed.
Next, we discuss about the various effects of aging on the performance of MUX
PUFs. We extend the linear delay model to include the variations in delay parameters
due to aging. The model makes certain assumptions about how noise and aging affect
the delay chain (consisting of the multiplexers) and the arbiter. We assume that for a
fixed set of conditions, the noise can only cause a constant amount of degradation to
the performance of an aging PUF. However, aging which is caused due to undesirable
changes like negative bias temperature instability (NBTI), hot carrier injection (HCI)
and time dependent dielectric breakdown (TDDB) results in a gradual degradation of
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performance. That is, the variations due to aging gradually increase with time in con-
trast to that of noise. In our study, we compare the standalone effects of aging and noise
on the PUF. We observe that for the same amount of variation, aging degrades the au-
thentication performance much more than noise. Furthermore, experimental aging data
collected from PUFs in our lab suggest that the percent variation in delay parameters
can be modelled as a Gaussian distribution. However, there is a small difference in
how the percent variations of delay-differences of MUX stages and the arbiter delay are
modelled. The former is a zero mean Gaussian, whereas the latter is a positive mean
Gaussian with mean and variance both gradually increasing with aging. In addition,
the variation in arbiter delay is assumed to be higher than that of delay-differences due
to “asymmetric” aging in case of arbiter. This happens under unequal aging scenario.
Using a Monte-Carlo based simulation for aging, authentication accuracy of the three
configurations are studied. We also suggest approaches to improve the authentication
accuracy that will increase the lifetime of a PUF. This can be done by either recalibrat-
ing the delay parameters or by tuning a threshold based on total delay-difference.
Next, we discuss an entropy based approach that can be used to identify whether
a MUX is linear or non-linear. The approach is focused on computing the conditional
entropy of responses to a set of predefined challenges. The challenge set consists of
randomly chosen challenges and their 1-bit neighbors. The entropy is computed across
the responses of two 1-bit neighboring challenges. For non-linear MUX PUFs like feed-
forward, the method determines the MUX stages which are controlled by internally
generated challenge bits as opposed to external challenge bits. This is based on the
observation that the conditional entropy for each of these stages is zero. Also, the num-
ber of zero conditional entropy values across the MUX stages provide an upper bound
on the number of internal arbiters present in the PUF. With the proposed approach,
we observe 100% sensitivity and 100% specificity for identifying non-linearity. Further-
more, we show that the proposed approach requires very less number of stable random
challenges (about 50) for successfully determining whether a PUF is linear or not for
real chips.
Our next contribution involves a logistic regression based approach to predict the
soft-response for a challenge using the total delay-difference as an input. This approach
enables us to determine whether a challenge is stable or not. The approach learns
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a logistic function based on the total delay-difference which has just 3 parameters.
Therefore, this is a simple approach which gives comparable performance against a
more complex approach based on artificial neural network (ANN) models. The model
demonstrates good sensitivity and precision but poor specificity.
Finally, we discuss a bit-flipping algorithm used to convert the unstable challenges
to stable challenges. It is based on the idea that a threshold on the total delay-difference
can guarantee stability of challenges. The thresholds can be obtained empirically from
the probability distributions of the total delay-difference. A straightforward approach is
to discard and issue a new random challenge for authentication if the current challenge
is unstable. In this paper, we propose a novel bit-flipping based approach in which we
claim that by flipping few bits of the original unstable challenge, we can convert it to
a stable one with minimal number of bit-flips. By using the algorithm, we are able to
transform the most likely unstable challenges to stable ones, typically with 1 bit-flip for
linear and modified feed-forward PUFs and 3 bit-flips for the feed-forward PUFs. These
bit-flips correspond to the flips in the XOR-ed challenge. We also compare the compu-
tation complexities of best, average and worst-case scenarios for the straightforward and
proposed approaches. In terms of number of addition operations, the proposed approach
has slightly better average-case performance but much better worst-case performance
than the straightforward approach.
iv
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Introduction
Physical unclonable functions (PUFs) [1, 2, 3] are novel security primitives used in
applications of hardware security. They are formulated from the notion of physical
random functions [2]. They can be implemented using conventional integrated circuit
(IC) design techniques. This leads us to a method of identifying and authenticating
individual ICs and a means of building secure smartcards. There are many methods
available to identify and authenticate ICs. One can embed a unique identifier in an IC to
give it a unique identity. This approach can identify the IC, but cannot authenticate it.
To enable authentication, one needs to embed a secret key onto the IC. This key needs to
remain secret, which means the IC has to be resistant to attacks which may attempt to
discover the key. Numerous attack models have been described in the literature [4, 5, 6].
The secret keys in a PUF are due to the uncontrollable process variations that
occur during the manufacturing. That is, they are derived from the complex physical
properties of the PUF rather than the traditional method of obtaining them from a
non-volatile memory. For example, volatile secret keys can be generated just from the
random delay characteristics of wires and transistors. Such keys form the signature
of a hardware like PUF. Because a device like PUF taps into the random variations
occuring during the fabrication process, these secret keys are difficult to predict, clone
or duplicate. PUFs, therefore, present an efficient and reliable way to generate volatile
secrets that only exist in digitial form when they are powered on and running [7].
1
2Various types of PUFs have been discussed in the literature [8, 9]. They can be
mainly differentiated based on how the randomness was originally introduced, i.e., in-
trinsically or extrinsically. The inherent properties of a PUF greatly depends up on
this differentiation. Extrinsic-based PUFs have a much greater ability to distinguish
between devices and have minimal environmental variation compared to intrinsic-based
PUFs. This is because of the underlying principles and parameters which can be directly
controlled and optimized for extrinsic-based PUFs. However, intrinsic-based PUFs are
more attractive because they can be included in a design without any modification to the
manufacturing process. Some of the popular intrinsic-based PUF designs are: delay-
based PUFs (which include ring-oscillator (RO PUF) [10], multiplexer-based (MUX
PUF) [7, 11]), SRAM-based PUFs [12] etc. In this work, we will be dealing with delay-
based MUX PUFs.
The thesis is organized in the following way:
• Chapter 2 discusses about the various types of multiplexer-based PUFs (MUX
PUFs) and the schemes used for authentication. We also discuss the formulation
of linear delay model, hard and soft-response and also how challenge-response
pairs (CRPs) are classified as stable and unstable. We also discuss about the
various metrics used to analyze the performance of PUFs. The basic lab setup
used for the collection of data is also described.
• Chapter 3 discusses the various effects of aging on PUFs. We propose a Monte-
Carlo based simulation model for analyzing the effects of aging.
• Chapter 4 discusses an entropy based approach to detect linearity in MUX PUFs.
• Chapter 5 proposes a logistic regression based model for classification of challenges
as stable or not. The model is used to train a response curve for the arbiter.
• Chapter 6 discusses the bit-flipping algorithm that can be used to convert an
unstable challenge to a stable one.
• Chapter 7 concludes the paper and discusses possible future directions.
Chapter 2
Multiplexer-based delay PUFs
2.1 Introduction
Just like any other device, a PUF can be modelled in terms of its input-output rela-
tionship. The input is termed as challenge and output as response. This input-output
relationship can be termed as a challenge-response pair, or CRP for short. For tran-
sistors used in PUFs, manufacturing randomness exists due to variations in transistor
length, width, gate oxide thickness, doping concentration density, body bias, metal
width, metal thickness, and interlevel dielectric (ILD) thickness, and so on [11, 13].
These manufacturing variations lead to a significant amount of variability in PUFs.
This helps in the generation of significant number of unique CRPs for each PUF IC. In
this work, we mainly deal with the multiplexer-based PUFs.
A multiplexer or MUX PUF is an example of strong PUF [14], which can accommo-
date many possible challenge-response pairs (CRPs). One of the advantages of a MUX
PUF is its simplistic design that enables flexibility in its structure. There are various
types of MUX PUFs available in PUF literature [11, 15].
A simple MUX PUF, also called as linear MUX PUF, is shown in Fig. 2.1. It has
N multiplexer stages and an arbiter at the end. The response is generated based on
the input challenge and the inherent process variations of the PUF chip. The process
variations are due to the variations in delay parameters of the multiplexer and arbiter.
Control bit for each MUX stage is obtained from the N -bit input challenge. That is,
MUXes in each stage act as a switch to either cross or straight propagate the rising
3
4Fig. 2.1: A Linear MUX PUF
edge signal, based on the corresponding challenge bit. Therefore, there exists two paths
traversed by the rising edge signal. The arbiter which is usually an SR-latch or flip-flop,
outputs a 1-bit response. It translates the analog timing difference between the two
paths into a digital value. For instance, if the rising edge signal arrives at the top input
of the arbiter earlier than the signal arriving at the bottom input, the output will be
‘1’; otherwise, if it reaches the bottom path first, the output will be ‘0’.
Using the skeletal structure of the simple linear MUX PUF (Fig. 2.1), more complex
MUX PUF configurations are possible. Two such examples are the feed-forward and
modified feed-forward configurations [11, 16], shown in Fig. 2.2. There also exist recon-
figurable PUF configurations like logic-reconfigurable or CRP-reconfigurable [11, 17, 18].
Examples of logic-reconfigurable PUFs are overlap, cascade and separate feed-forward
structures. They are classified based on the arrangement of internal arbiters in the
PUF structure. We will analyze these configurations using an entropy based approach
in Chapter 4 [19].
Feed-forward structures shown in Fig. 2.2 have non-linearity added into the original
linear MUX PUF configuration. This is done by inserting an additional internal (or
intermediate) arbiter. Furthermore, the modified feed-forward configuration proposed
in [11] has an additional inter-connection in the intermediate stage. Fig. 2.2 shows an
example in which the internally generated challenge bits are at successive stages, N2
and N2+1. The main purpose of these configurations is to increase the security of MUX
PUFs. Works in [5, 20] analyze the security aspect of these PUFs. In this work, we will
analyze and compare the performance of the three configurations discussed so far, i.e.,
linear, feed-forward and modified feed-forward configurations.
5Fig. 2.2: Feed-forward PUF (top), and modified feed-forward PUF (bottom) configurations
2.2 Linear Delay Model
2.2.1 Total Delay-Difference and Hard Response
Previously, we discussed the basic structure that constitutes a linear MUX PUF as
shown in Fig. 2.1. The input is an N -bit challenge and output is 1-bit response. A
rising edge signal excites two paths at the first MUX stage simultaneously. The actual
(two) propagated paths are determined by the N -bit input challenge. After the last
MUX stage, the arbiter generates 1-bit response by comparing the arrival times of the
two paths at its input. Therefore, it is standard to model a MUX PUF using an additive
linear delay model [11, 21, 22], as shown below:
rN =
N+1∑
i=1
(−1)C′i∆i =
Additive linear model︷ ︸︸ ︷
N∑
i=1
(−1)C′i∆i︸ ︷︷ ︸
Delay Chain
+ ∆arb︸︷︷︸
Arbiter
(2.1)
R = sign(rN ) =
1, rN ≥ 00, rN < 0 (2.2)
In (2.1, 2.2), rN is the total delay-difference and R is the final response bit. C
′
i=⊕Nj=iCj
is the XOR-ed challenge bit corresponding to challenge bit Ci, ∆
i is the ith stage delay-
difference and ∆arb=∆N+1 (C ′N+1=0) is the bias corresponding to the arbiter delay [11].
6The N MUX stages constitute the delay chain. The final response bit, R, takes value
‘0’ or ‘1’ depending on the sign of total delay-difference, rN . Response, R, is also called
as a hard-response because it can only take binary values ‘0’ or ‘1’.
2.2.2 Soft-Response
We can also define the PUF response in terms of a soft-response, Rs. Soft-response,
Rs, can be defined as the probability of response to be ‘1’ (or ‘0’), i.e., Rs=P (R =
‘1′)=R1M , where R1 is the number of times the response bit is ‘1’ out of M measurements.
The probabilistic behaviour of the response can be modelled by considering factors like
environmental noise and metastability.
Environmental noise can be attributed due to changes in supply voltage or temper-
ature. In such a case, the model in (2.1) needs to be modified to include the variations
due to noise. Additive noise model is used for this purpose. The modified expression
after adding the noise variations to the delay parameters, ∆i and ∆arb, is shown below:
rN =
N+1∑
i=1
(−1)C′i∆i +
N+1∑
i=1
ni (2.3)
where ni is the environmental noise contribution in the MUX stages and arbiter.
However, to study the effects of metastability, we need to consider timing parameters
of the arbiter like setup and hold time. For a CMOS based latch, valid data must be
present at the input for a specified period of time before the clock signal arrives. This is
the setup time. Also, the data must remain valid for a specified period of time after the
clock transition which is its hold time. Any change in data signal which occurs between
these times will result in output reaching intermediate voltage levels, and remain there
for an indefinite amount of time before resolving to either a high or low signal. This
stable high or low output state depends upon the process technology, manufacturing and
environmental conditions. It is almost impossible to predict the final stable state. More
secure configurations like feed-forward show a higher degree of metastability compared
to linear or modified feed-forward configurations [23, 24, 25, 26].
Fig. 2.3 shows two possible metastable conditions that can occur in the arbiter. First
case (denoted by I) shows the signal states when the clock (or reset, R) arrives later
at the arbiter relative to the data, and second (denoted by II) when the clock arrives
7Fig. 2.3: Metastable states that can occur in the latch/arbiter of a MUX PUF in case of two
different scenarios
first relative to the data (or set, S). In the former case, the total delay-difference, rN ,
is negative and in the latter it takes a positive value. This is analogous to a ball rolling
over a hill (due to Gaussian nature of rN ) and each side represents a stable state for the
response bit. The top of the hill represents a metastable state [27]. When |rN |/Tsetup
(I) or |rN |/Thold (II) (shaded area in figure), the PUF is in a metastable state.
2.2.3 Stable and Unstable CRPs
Due to the effects of metastability and environmental noise, the PUF response, R, to
a given challenge can vary over time. Due to these variations, the soft-response, Rs,
to a challenge can take any value in between 0 and 1. We can, therefore, classify
the challenge-response pairs (CRPs) as either stable or unstable based on a threshold
defined on the soft-response, Rs. We choose the threshold to be 0.1-0.9, which means if
the soft-response, Rs, is between 0.1 and 0.9, the CRP is deemed unstable, otherwise it
is considered to be a stable ‘0’ or ‘1’. In our lab, we use a soft-response based chip to do
such a classification [28]. We will discuss more about the lab setup in the next sections.
8Fig. 2.4: Histogram of total delay-difference, rN , for linear (top left), modified feed-forward
(top right) and feed-forward (bottom) configurations (using ground truth from the chips).
2.2.4 Probability distribution of Total Delay-Difference
Similar to the linear configuration in (2.1, 2.2), expressions for total delay-difference,
rN , and final response bit, R, in case of feed-forward and modified feed-forward configu-
rations can also be obtained. Independent of the PUF configuration, an N -stage MUX
PUF has total delay-difference, rN , distributed as N
(
µarb, 2Nσ
2 + σ2arb + (N + 1)σ
2
n
)
,
where N(0, 2Nσ2) is due to the multiplexer stages, N(µarb, σ
2
arb) is due to the arbiter
delay and N
(
0, (N + 1)σ2n
)
is due to environmental noise. Here, σ2 is the variance of
multiplexer delay, µarb and σ
2
arb are the mean and variance of arbiter delay and σ
2
n is
the variance of environmental noise.
Fig. 6.2 shows the distribution of total delay-difference, rN , with 10,000 random
challenges for the three PUF configurations. Observe that the feed-forward configuration
has a higher spread of rN for unstable challenges (blue color). This is due to an increased
metastability [26]. For our chips, variance of rN for unstable challenges in case of feed-
forward configuration is atleast 10 times more than the other two configurations. For
linear and modified feed-forward configurations, total delay-difference, rN , of unstable
9Fig. 2.5: Probability distributions of rN corresponding to stable 0 and stable 1 response bits
for a linear PUF with noise std=5% of std of ∆i.
challenges are much more closer to 0. As discussed before, the definition of unstable
CRPs comes from a thresholding (0.1-0.9) based on the soft-response [28]. Feed-forward
configurations have about 85% of challenges being stable, compared to about 89-90%
in the case of linear and modified feed-forward configurations. Fig. 2.5 shows the
probability distribution of rN corresponding to the stable 0 and stable 1 CRPs for a
linear PUF. As can be observed from the figure, there is a small degree of overlap
between the distributions. This corresponds to the environmental noise present in (2.3)
and represents the error present in the proposed model.
2.3 Authentication of PUFs
PUF devices are used in hardware security for applications of device authentication [29].
A typical PUF authentication scheme is shown in Fig. 2.6 [28]. It can be described in
terms of two phases:
• Enrollment phase: A large set of challenge-response pairs (CRPs) is measured
from each fabricated chip and stored on a secure server. The stored data is in the
form of lookup tables (LUTs) as shown in Fig. 2.6.
• Authentication phase: The server receives an authentication request along with
the chip ID from the user and selects a list of random challenges from its database.
These challenges are sent to the user, and their responses are sent back to the
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Fig. 2.6: Typical authentication procedure based on chip ID and PUF
server. The user is “granted access” to the PUF if the responses from the chip
match to those stored in the LUT.
The CRPs stored in the LUT during the enrollment phase form the signature of a
PUF. These CRPs are unique for a given PUF chip. However, to maintain a sufficient
amount of uniqueness, the LUT can typically contain thousands of CRPs which require
a huge amount of server space for storing them. There are other alternative approaches
that consume much lesser storage area [5, 6]. Work in [5] discusses the idea of esti-
mating the delay parameters of a MUX PUF and storing them in the server for the
computation of final response. The final response obtained from the stored parameters
is then compared against that obtained from the PUF when excited by the chosen set of
challenges. This method only requires storage space corresponding to the size of MUX
PUF in use. We will utilize this approach later in Chapter 3.
For successful authentication of PUFs, we typically define a threshold corresponding
to the amount of error that can be tolerated on the response bits. For a given response
length (corresponding to the number of CRPs used for authentication) and threshold,
we can compute the false positive and false negative rates. False positive rate is the
probability that PUF A will be authenticated as PUF B when PUF A produces the
same output as PUF B, and false negative rate is the probability that a correct PUF
will fail to be authenticated. The former happens when two PUFs generate similar
outputs, whereas the latter happens when a PUF fails to generate a consistent output.
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An example is discussed in [7] where an error of 10 out of 128 bits is tolerated for
a successful authentication. The false positive and false negative rates are calculated
to be about 2.1×10−21 and 5×10−11, respectively. These are computed based on the
inter-chip and intra-chip variations, respectively. False positive depends on the relative
uniqueness (or inter-chip variation) of a PUF A with respect to another PUF B. Higher
the uniqueness (or inter-chip variation) between the two chips, lower is the false positive
rate. On the other hand, false negative rate depends on the stability (or consistency) of
the responses being generated by the PUF. The responses to certain challenges are more
inconsistent than the others. Therefore, having more of such CRPs (i.e., ones with lower
stability or higher intra-chip variation) contribute to a higher false negative rate. In the
previous section, we had discussed about unstable CRPs which possess soft-response
values between 0.1 and 0.9. While selecting random challenges for authentication, we
prefer to avoid such challenges. However as discussed previously, the probability of
encountering such CRPs is low, in the range 10-15%. In case these challenges get
selected, we need to ensure that the error in the response bits is within the tolerance
limit. In Chapter 6, we will discuss some approaches to deal with unstable CRPs.
2.4 PUF Performance Metrics
There are various metrics that can be used to analyze the performance of different
PUF configurations [11, 30, 7, 31]. In previous section, we observed that among the
three PUF configurations, feed-forward is the most unreliable due to a higher number
of unstable CRPs. In this case, we used reliability as the performance metric. Similarly,
we can list other performance metrics as follows:
• Reliability : Reliability or intra-chip variation is a measure of reliability of the
PUF, which is determined by comparing the digital signatures of the PUF to the
same challenge under different environmental conditions. It is the probability that
a certain response bit will flip when a given challenge is applied multiple times. It
is essentially same as a soft-response, Rs, except it is averaged across a set of CRPs
rather than just one CRP. The set of CRPs is the one chosen for authentication.
Reliability is computed as 1−Pintra, where Pintra is the intra-chip variation of the
PUF.
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• Uniqueness : Uniqueness or inter-chip variation is determined by comparing the
digital signature of a PUF to that of another. All possible chip-combinations
should be considered for the comparison. Inter-chip variation, Pinter=50% repre-
sents the best uniqueness for a PUF. Uniqueness is computed as 1− |2Pinter − 1|.
• Randomness : Ideally, a MUX PUF is expected to produce unbiased ‘0’ or ‘1’ as the
response. Randomness represents the ability of the PUF to output the response
as ‘0’ or ‘1’ with equal probability. Therefore, it is equal to 1-|2P (R = 1)-1|.
• Unpredictability : Unpredictability measures the degree of security possessed by
a particular PUF configuration. In other words, it ensures that an adversary
cannot efficiently compute the PUF response to an unknown challenge, even if he
can adaptively obtain a certain number of other CRPs from the same and other
PUF instances. PUF literature discusses various attack based models that analyze
the unpredictability of different PUF configurations.
2.5 PUF Setup
In this section, we will discuss about the hardware setup used for our experiments.
Our chips implement 32 stage MUX PUF which has approximately 4.3×109 challenge
choices (=232). The technology used for the fabrication is 32nm IBM HKMG [28]. Fig.
2.7 shows the basic layout of the IC used in the lab. Typical voltage, temperature and
other settings like type of arbiter and voltage-controlled oscillator (VCO) frequency are
also shown in the table.
Each PUF IC has 48 linear and feed-forward MUX PUF configurations arranged in
a 6×16 grid. Top three rows are the linear PUFs and the bottom three are the feed-
forward configured PUFs. The feed-forward configuration can be configured as a linear
configuration by disabling the intermediate stage. Likewise, it can also be configured
as a modified feed-forward configuration by adding an extra inter-connection, as in Fig.
2.2. Top three rows are the linear PUFs and the bottom three are the feed-forward
configured PUFs.
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Fig. 2.7: 32nm chip microphotograph and summary table.
2.5.1 Data Collection
In previous section, we have discussed about the importance of a soft-response based
analysis of the PUF output. We use temporal majority voting (TMV) scheme to convert
a soft-response to a hard-response. It is essentially used to address the response insta-
bility occurring due to factors like metastability and environmental noise. According
to this method, the PUF response is read out multiple times and the majority value
is taken as the final PUF response [28, 32, 33, 34]. However, the so called unstable
CRPs have variations in their responses. To overcome this limitation, an authentica-
tion strategy based on thresholding of the soft-response is used. As discussed before,
the threshold chosen is 0.1-0.9.
In the PUF chip, we take 102,400 measurements of the response to a given challenge.
By using an 1/1024 fast on-chip divider, the measurements are then converted to a value
between 0 and 1. This is the soft-response. For example, if we obtain the response bit
as ‘1’ for 100,000 times out of 102,400, the soft-response, Rs, is ∼0.977. Furthermore,
by applying a threshold of 0.1-0.9, we can consider the soft-response value of 0.977 to
be a stable ‘1’ bit (∵ 0.977>0.9). Using similar steps, we can classify all CRPs to be
either stable ‘0’, stable ‘1’ or unstable. The experimental results show that by selecting
the stable CRPs based on soft responses, the PUFs can work reliably under a wider
range of VDD and temperature.
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Fig. 2.8 shows the PUF design which can collect massive PUF data using an on-
chip voltage controlled oscillator running at gigahertz frequencies [28]. The basic idea
is to measure the probability of the response being ‘1’ or ‘0’ using an on-chip counter
which counts the arbiter outputs, and compare the value with the total number of VCO
cycles. The ratio between the two count values is the probability of the response being
‘0’, P(R=‘0’). The probability of response being ‘1’ can be computed as, P(R=‘1’)=1-
P(R=‘0’).
Fig. 2.8: MUX PUF design utilizing an on-chip voltage controlled oscillator circuit and counters
to efficiently collect soft response.
Chapter 3
Effect of Aging on MUX-PUFs
3.1 Introduction
The behavior of challenge-response pairs (CRPs) of MUX PUFs can be modeled using
various adaptive learning techniques [5, 6, 20]. As mentioned in previous chapter, we
are particularly interested in a least mean square (LMS) based approach which has
been used to estimate the delay-difference of MUX stages [5]. The estimated model
parameters can then be stored in a server database and used for authentication. While
similar approaches have been proposed before [6, 35], this method proposes to store the
physical parameters of the model as opposed to those of an artificial neural network
(ANN) or other non-linear models [20]. Furthermore, the parameters of ANN or other
models do not correspond to the intrinsic physical parameters of the chip. The proposed
method in [5] can be considered canonic as it is based on the physical parameters that
correspond to N multiplexer stages and arbiter(s).
For applications in authentication, we desire PUFs to perform reliably over time.
But various uncontrollable factors like environmental noise, metastability and aging de-
grade the authentication accuracy of a PUF. Environmental noise mainly occurs due to
variations in temperature and/or supply voltage; and metastability occurs due to timing
violations at the input of arbiter. However, for a given environmental condition, the
effect of environmental noise and metastability on the PUF performance is a constant.
In contrast, aging affects the reliability of a PUF over an extended period of time.
Aging is mainly caused due to undesirable changes in hardware structure such as
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negative bias temperature instability (NBTI), hot carrier injection (HCI) and time de-
pendent dielectric breakdown (TDDB) [36, 37]. NBTI and HCI, in particular, are known
to induce progressive slowdown in hardware [37, 38]. This results in a gradual increase
in the delays of hardware structures like multiplexers. In the proposed aging model, the
increase in delays results in a slowdown effect in terms of the delays of multiplexers and
arbiter(s). It is known that the multiplexer delays of a PUF are distributed randomly
[21, 22]. We assume that, due to aging, the mean and variance of these delays gradu-
ally increase. This has been shown to be a valid assumption in prior aging works on
delay-based PUFs [39]. However, our model considers the delay-difference rather than
the delays for each MUX stage. We assume that the delay-differences are distributed
with zero mean and variance which increases gradually with aging. In addition to the
delay stages, the arbiter (which is typically an SR latch) also forms a key component
in the functioning of a PUF. In [24, 40], it is shown that for a latch/flip-flop, various
timing related factors like setup time, hold time, clock-to-output and data-to-output
can increase with aging. This work considers the effect of aging on arbiter in terms of
only its propagation delay (or clock-to-output). In [39], it is shown that the arbiter in
a delay-based PUF forms an Achilles’ heel due to its “asymmetric” aging. Therefore,
we can assume that the variations in the arbiter due to aging would be much more
significant compared to the stage delay-differences. We will discuss this more in the
next parts.
Our work in [41] proposes an aging and noise based model for analyzing MUX-based
PUFs. The model simulates conditions close to that for a real chip. The role of such a
statistical simulation framework is important in the sense that both existing and new
PUF structures can be characterized with respect to aging and noise effects without
fabricating chips. Using the model, we investigate how various PUF configurations are
affected by aging. One may be led to believe that the delay difference of a MUX stage
would not be affected by aging if both the delay paths age by same amount. However,
this is not true as the top and bottom path-delays both increase but by different amounts
even after applying the same stress condition for the same stress duration [42, 43]. If
the top path-delay increases more (or less) than the bottom path-delay, the total delay-
difference increases (or decreases) and thus, the final response bit can flip. Intuitively,
this explains why the delay difference variation can be modeled as a zero-mean Gaussian
17
Fig. 3.1: An example showing two scenarios of how the delay-difference of a MUX stage can vary
with aging. Di corresponds to delays of top and bottom multiplexers, ∆i to the delay difference
and pi to the percentage change in delay-difference. pi can be both positive or negative with
aging.
random variable. An example is shown in Fig. 3.1. In this work, we show that the
variations in delay-difference due to aging can be modeled in terms of a ratio between
two correlated Gaussian distributions and then, approximated as a zero mean Gaussian
distribution with increasing variance. The arbiter delay, on the other hand, is modeled
in the same way except the ratio distribution has a positive mean.
A prior aging work on linear PUFs [44] concluded that the effect of aging on PUFs is
permanent and, therefore, the unstable (or unreliable) challenges need to discarded. In
our work, we argue that, despite irreversible changes in the PUF structure due to aging,
it can still be used for authentication by using suitable methods. One approach is to
recalibrate the model parameters (i.e., the delay differences and the arbiter delay). The
recalibration can be done by using the LMS method described in [5]. However, recali-
brating hundreds of devices is not a feasible solution. Another approach for improving
the authentication performance is by choosing appropriate thresholds on total delay-
difference to discard challenges that are unreliable. We investigate these approaches in
the upcoming sections.
3.2 Background and Aging Model
3.2.1 Aging model for the delay chain
A linear MUX PUF (shown in Fig. 2.1) has N multiplexer stages and an arbiter at
the end. Control bits for each MUX stage are obtained from the input challenge. For
MUX stage i, the delay-difference, ∆i = Ditop−Dibottom, where Ditop and Dibottom are the
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delays associated with top and bottom multiplexers of the ith stage. We will assume
multiplexer delays, Ditop and D
i
bottom, to be Gaussian distributed as N(µ, σ
2) [21] (this
can be attributed to the manufacturing process variations which tend to be random in
nature). Therefore, delay-difference of the ith stage, ∆i, will be distributed as N(0, 2σ2).
Due to aging, the multiplexer delays of each stage gradually increase, which cor-
responds to an increase of mean and variance to (µ′,σ2a). Therefore, the new delay-
difference of the ith stage, ∆iaged, will be distributed as N(0, 2σ
2
a) (where σa>σ). This
is validated in prior aging work [39], where it is shown that the standard deviation of
delay-difference increases with aging. The new delay-difference of the ith stage for an
aged PUF can be expressed as:
∆iaged = ∆
i
(
1 +
∆iaged −∆i
∆i
)
= ∆i (1 + pi) (3.1)
where pi is the percent delay-difference variation in the i
th stage. pi is basically the
ratio of two correlated Gaussian distributions, N(0, 2(σ2 + σ2a + 2ρσσa)) and N(0, 2σ
2)
(where ρ is the correlation coefficient between ∆i and ∆iaged). As the variance of ∆
i
increases with aging, σ2a term in the variance of pi will start to dominate. Therefore,
the variance of these approximate distributions is to an extent proportional to σ2a. Prior
work in [45] suggests some approximate distributions for correlated ratio distributions
in terms of Gaussian, t-distribution etc. Also, in [46] a ratio of two Gaussians has been
used to model true random number generators.
Using aging data collected from test chips for upto 10 hours, we observe that the
ratio distributions have a good fit with t-distribution. Fig. 3.2 shows ratio distributions
for recovery times of 2 and 6 hours using a voltage based stress test, where the voltage
was increased from a nominal value of 0.9V to 1.8V at 25◦C. However, the data collected
was only for 3 chips and corresponds to 3x32=96 samples for 32-stage MUX PUFs. This
is insufficient in order to obtain a precise distribution of pi.
For our model, we adopt a Gaussian approximation for the ratio distribution (as
t-distribution is a good approximation for Gaussian when dealing with small sample
sizes). An example is ratio distribution, pi, with standard deviation=0.05 (or 5%). In
prior work [39], a 5% standard deviation in delay-difference roughly corresponds to 2
years of aging.
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Fig. 3.2: Ratio distribution with t-distribution fit for data collected from 3 chips for 2 hours
(left) and 6 hours (right) of aging. X axis is the percent delay-difference variation.
By using the model in (3.1) with a set of initial ∆i (sampled from a Gaussian
distribution with standard deviation,
√
2σ) and pi (sampled from a ratio distribution
with a given standard deviation), we can generate various instances of aged delay-
difference, ∆iaged, for a MUX stage i. Note that σ is obtained from the values of ∆
i
estimated from the test chip using LMS in [5].
3.2.2 Aging model for arbiter
The arbiter at the end of the delay chain, is modeled in a slightly different manner. We
model it in terms of its delay, ∆arb, which accounts for its propagation delay. However,
being a delay element, it can only take positive values unlike delay-difference and,
therefore, always has a positive mean. An aged ∆arb can be expressed similar to (3.1)
as:
∆arbaged = ∆
arb (1 + q) (3.2)
where q is the percent change in arbiter delay. The only difference is that q is Gaussian
distributed with a positive mean. Similar to the delay-difference, the mean and variance
of q increase with aging. However for simplicity, we assume that mean and variance are
related as µ2q=3σ
2
q (assuming q to be a uniform random variable between 0 and 2µq).
This means the mean, µq varies more rapidly than the standard deviation, σq.
We now summarize the assumptions made for the proposed aging model:
• For a given environmental condition, the effect of environmental noise on the PUF
performance is a constant. That is, over time the value of σn can be assumed to
be constant. This is true even when the PUF is undergoing gradual change due
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to the aging process.
• Variance of the delay parameters, for instance, delay-difference, 2σ2 and arbiter
delay, σ2arb, increase gradually with aging. The model considers them in the form
of variance of percentage distributions, pi and q.
• The variance of the percentage change in arbiter delay, q, increases much more
rapidly than that of delay-difference, pi. This means for a given amount of aging,
we can assume σarb>σ.
3.3 Aging Data
A lot of the aging based simulation methods discussed in literature are based on the
idea of accelerated aging [47, 48]. The effects of aging on a hardware like PUF can be
accelerated using various stress tests like voltage, temperature. Specifically for our lab
chips, we use voltage induced stress test for aging related measurements. In this test,
the VDD voltage is increased from a nominal value of 0.9 to 1.8 V for a specific duration
of time that corresponds to the amount of aging. Data is collected for up to 10 hours
of voltage stress from six 32-bit MUX-PUFs. As discussed in the previous chapter, the
PUF outputs are based on their soft-response.
3.3.1 Monte-Carlo Simulation
For a given amount of aging, we generate 1000 PUF instances using Monte-Carlo simu-
lation with percentage delay paramaters, pi and q, sampled from Gaussian distributions
with certain standard deviation. The (initial) delay-differences of individual MUX stage,
∆i, and arbiter delay, ∆arb, are taken from the model obtained from the actual chip [5].
Gaussian noise with a fixed standard deviation, σn, is added to the linear delay model.
To simulate aging over a period of time, standard deviations of pi and q are varied while
keeping the standard deviation of noise fixed.
3.4 Authentication Performance with Noise
The model in (2.3) includes the effect of environmental noise to the final response bit.
For a given environmental condition (like fixed temperature, voltage supply etc), the
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noise is modeled as a Gaussian distribution with fixed variance. Unlike aging, noise is
static and, therefore, the degradation in PUF performance is fixed. Fig. 2.5 shows the
probability distribution of rN for stable 0 and stable 1 response bits in the presence of
noise with standard deviation=5% std. of ∆i.
We can quantify the overlap between two distributions in terms of metrics like
Jensen-Shannon (JS) [49] or Henze-Penrose (HP) divergence [50]. Jenson-Shannon (or
JS) divergence is a symmetric form of Kullback-leibler (or KL) divergence [51]. JS
divergence between two distributions P and Q is defined as:
JS(P ||Q) = 1
2
(KL(P ||R) +KL(Q||R)),
where R =
1
2
(P +Q)
(3.3)
where KL(.) corresponds to KL divergence. We found KL divergence to be sensitive
to probabilities close to 0 which deemed it unsuitable. HP divergence is computed by
randomly choosing total delay-difference values, rN , from a sorted set of rN . The set
of rN should have equal number of stable 0 and stable 1 CRPs. HP divergence is equal
to 1− RN , where R is the number of differing classifications in the chosen set of size N .
JS divergence takes values between 0 to 1, whereas HP divergence takes values between
0.5 to 1.
For a good PUF reliability, we desire a higher divergence between the stable 0 and
stable 1 probability distributions. In Fig. 3.3 (dashed lines), we show how the two
metrics vary for different amounts of noise. The x-axis is the standard deviation of noise
(σn) represented as a percentage of the standard deviation (
√
2σ) of delay-difference, ∆i.
We observe that as the amount of noise increases, the overlap between the distributions
also increases and, therefore, the divergence value decreases. Out of the three PUF
configurations, feed-forward is the most affected by noise.
3.5 Authentication Performance with Aging
As mentioned before, we assume that the model parameters, i.e., delay-differences and
the arbiter delay, have been estimated and are stored in the server database. These
stored parameters are estimated for an un-aged PUF instance. But with time as the
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Fig. 3.3: Divergence metric comparisons in case of noise alone (dashed line) and aging alone
(solid line) scenarios with (left) Jensen-Shannon divergence (right) Henze-Penrose divergence.
Fig. 3.4: Percentage of successful authentications by assuming equal variance for the delay chain
and arbiter due to aging and in presence of 5% std of noise.
PUF starts to age, the delay-differences start to vary gradually and therefore, these
stored parameters (or even a CRP look-up table or other adaptive parameters) become
outdated. The result is a decrease in the percentage of successful authentications, as
shown in Fig. 3.4. An authentication is considered successful if the responses to the
challenges match with their expected values (which is obtained from the stored model
parameters or from a CRP look-up table).
The percentage of successful authentication at 0% standard deviation, i.e., for an un-
aged PUF, depends upon the amount of environmental noise added to the model. The
authentication accuracy is close to 100%. Fig. 3.4 shows the percentage of successful
authentications under equal aging scenario for the delay chain and arbiter, i.e., under
the assumption of equal variation for both. Note that unless otherwise mentioned, the
standard deviations for percentage variation, pi and q will be assumed to be equal for
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Fig. 3.5: Percentage of successful authentications with aging effect considered only on delay
chain (left) and only arbiter (right) in presence of 5% noise std.
Fig. 3.6: Number of bit flips 0→1 in Stable-0 (left) and 1→0 in Stable-1 (right) under equal
aging scenario.
a given amount of aging. However, as discussed before, we expect a higher variance for
arbiter than the delay chain. Fig. 3.5 shows the authentication accuracies for aging
effects considered separately on the delay chain and arbiter. We can observe that the
performance degradation due to aging in arbiter is significant.
Tables 6.1, 6.3 show the percentage of successful authentications under equal and
unequal aging conditions of the arbiter and delay-difference. We also compare the stan-
dalone effects of aging and noise on the performance of MUX PUFs. From Table 6.1, we
observe that under equal aging condition, both noise and aging affect the authentication
accuracy in a similar manner. That is, the performance is only slightly degraded in the
case of aging alone. From Table 6.3, we observe that under the assumption that the
variation in arbiter delay, q, is considerably more (i.e., 20%) than in delay-difference, pi,
the performance degradation in the case of aging alone is prominent than noise alone.
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Table 3.1: Percentage Successful Authentication under equal aging scenario; STD(q) = STD(pi)
% STD No Noise Noise STD=5% Noise STD=10% Noise STD=20%
Original 0.9993 0.9980 0.9930 0.9729
Linear 5% 0.9981 0.9967 0.9917 0.9714
10% 0.9927 0.9911 0.9860 0.9674
20% 0.9697 0.9683 0.9639 0.9487
Original 0.9985 0.9974 0.9921 0.9710
MFF 5% 0.9977 0.9963 0.9911 0.9698
10% 0.9923 0.9906 0.9854 0.9661
20% 0.9690 0.9675 0.9629 0.9486
Original 0.9982 0.9954 0.9863 0.9528
FF 5% 0.9955 0.9927 0.9837 0.9523
10% 0.9842 0.9817 0.9728 0.9450
20% 0.9463 0.9442 0.9387 0.9187
Table 3.2: Percentage Successful Authentication under unequal aging scenario; STD(q) =
STD(pi)+20%
%STD(p, q) No Noise Noise STD=5% Noise STD=10% Noise STD=20%
(0,20) 0.9961 0.9941 0.9892 0.9704
Linear (5,25) 0.9914 0.9898 0.9843 0.9657
(10,30) 0.9825 0.9805 0.9761 0.9594
(20,40) 0.9568 0.9556 0.9526 0.9409
(0,20) 0.9960 0.9944 0.9891 0.9694
MFF (5,25) 0.9912 0.9896 0.9848 0.9663
(10,30) 0.9827 0.9815 0.9761 0.9592
(20,40) 0.9566 0.9561 0.9528 0.9391
(0,20) 0.9795 0.9773 0.9700 0.9441
FF (5,25) 0.9672 0.9654 0.9591 0.9354
(10,30) 0.9506 0.9494 0.9433 0.9248
(20,40) 0.9136 0.9124 0.9096 0.8937
Fig. 3.6 shows the number of bit flips for Stable-0 and Stable-1 response bits with
aging. The top curves (solid line) in each figure show a decrease in the number of
stable-0s (or stable-1s) with aging. The bottom curves (dashed line) show an increase
in the number of flipped bits corresponding to stable-0s (or stable-1s). For a fixed
level of aging, we observe that the number of bit-flips is the highest for the feed-forward
configuration. For example, for 33% standard deviation of delay-difference variation, the
percentage of Stable-0 bit-flips for linear/modified feed-forward is roughly 2423469=6.97%
and for feed-forward is 3693277=11.3%. Similarly, for a 33% standard deviation of percent
delay-difference variation, the percentage of Stable-1 bit-flips for linear/modified feed-
forward is roughly 3745515=6.78% and for feed-forward is
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5159=9.32%. We can observe
that the number of bit-flips Stable-0→1 is more than Stable-1→0. This is evident from
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Fig. 3.7: Probability distributions of stable 0 and stable 1 response bits with aging with 30%
delay variation for a linear PUF
the fact that the mean of total delay-difference, rN , (i.e., µarb) increases with aging.
Also, note that for an unaged PUF instance (i.e., 0% variation), the response bits are
slightly skewed towards bit ‘1’. This is because the overall mean of the distribution in
Fig. 6.2 is non-zero (= µarb).
We observed that with aging, a feed-forward configuration is more prone to bit flips
and therefore, has more authentication failures than the other two configurations. This
is because any bit-flip in the intermediate response bit (or the internal challenge bit)
affects the final response bit much more significantly than in the case of modified feed-
forward or linear configuration. In case of modified feed-forward, the interconnection
between consecutive stages (almost) negates the effect of internal challenge bits on the
final response.
Similar to the case of noise, the overlap between the stable-0 and stable-1 distribu-
tions would increase with aging (as shown in Fig. 3.7). Fig. 3.3 (solid lines) shows
how both the divergences (JSD and HPD) change with aging. We observe that both
aging and noise affect the authentication performance in a similar manner. Even so, for
the same amount of percent variation, the performance is slightly worse for aging. The
difference is mainly due to the way the arbiter ages with time.
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3.6 Temporal Properties of unstable CRPs
In this section, we discuss about how aging affects the (initial) unstable CRPs. Note
that these CRPs are unstable in an un-aged PUF due to the effects of metastability
or environmental noise. Here, we are interested in studying the variations in the total
delay-difference, rN , of these CRPs due to aging. Fig. 3.8 shows how the variance of
rN for unstable challenges varies with time. As observed, the variance for all the three
PUF configurations increases with aging. Also, we had observed that stable challenges
possess higher values of total delay-difference, rN . Hence, it is logical to think that some
of these unstable challenges would become stable. To validate this, we choose a threshold
for rN (say, α=0.4σ, where σ is the standard deviation of total delay-difference, rN , for
un-aged PUF shown in Fig. 6.2). We then observe how the percentage of unstable
challenges with |rN |>α varies with aging. This is shown in Fig. 3.8.
We can observe that the percentage of unstable challenges with |rN |>α increases
with time (or aging). For linear and modified feed-forward configurations, the percent-
age remains near 0 till about 7% standard deviation of delay-difference variation (pi or
q). This means that, in the initial periods of aging, there is hardly any increase in the
number of unstable challenges with |rN |>α. This is due to the choice of α (=0.4σ),
which essentially guarantees the stability of these CRPs. Feed-forward configuration,
on the other hand, has higher (∼25%) percentage of unstable challenges with |rN |>α,
even in the un-aged case. This indicates that for feed-forward, α=0.4σ is not an optimal
value of rN for guaranteeing stability. We choose a value of α=2.4σ empirically for this
case.
Furthermore, from Fig. 3.8 we can say that for linear and modified feed-forward
configurations, about 25% of (initially) unstable CRPs have become stable for a 33%
standard deviation of percent delay-difference. Note that 25% of unstable CRPs is
roughly equal to 25100x10%≈2.5% of total CRPs. In case of feed-forward, such claims can
only be made at higher values of α like 2.4σ. However at this threshold, we observe that
only a very small percent (<0.1%) of unstable CRPs become stable. Nonetheless for
the three configurations, unstable CRPs with |rN |>α can be re-used for authentication
in an aged PUF.
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Fig. 3.8: Variance of rN for unstable challenges with aging (left), Percentage of unstable chal-
lenges with |rN |>α, where α=0.4σ (right).
3.7 Recalibration and Threshold Tuning
Previously in Fig. 3.4, we had discussed about the authentication failures occurring due
to aging. This happens when the (aged) delay-differences start to vary from the ones
stored in the server database. A simple solution for this problem is to re-estimate the
new delay-differences using the LMS technique described in [5]. For the LMS estimation,
a sufficient number of CRPs (<2000) will give us a prediction accuracy close to 100% in
case of linear MUX PUFs. Note that other more complex MUX PUF configurations can
be reconfigured as a linear configuration by the use of fuses. However, a disadvantage
of the approach is that with the increasing number of PUF devices in the market, the
number of devices needing recalibration will be very high. Therefore, the approach will
prove to be costly and is not feasible in practise.
We propose an alternative approach to improve the reliability by selecting appro-
priate thresholds (say, β) on the total delay-difference, rN , values of an un-aged PUF.
A desired value of β will correspond to the total delay-difference, rN , of CRPs that are
immune to aging related bit-flips.
Fig. 3.9 shows the percentage of error (or failure) in authentications against vary-
ing threshold, β. Note that, 100-(% error) is equal to the percentage of successful
authentications. From the plot, it is easy to observe that CRPs with a higher total
delay-difference, rN , value are more immune to bit-flips. Therefore, a logical choice for
optimal β is to choose it as high as possible. For example, for linear configuration β=0.3
is a “good” choice of threshold for up to a standard deviation of pi=q=16.7% (equal
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Fig. 3.9: Thresholds, β, for a fixed error tolerance=1.5% for linear (top left), modified feed-
forward (top right), and feed-forward (bottom).
aging scenario). It corresponds to low bit-flips (∼0.02%) for 16.7% standard deviation
of pi and q. In previous discussion on unstable CRPs, we observed that α=0.4σ≈0.3
(σ=0.75 is the standard deviation of rN for our chip) guaranteed the stability of CRPs
for up to about 15% standard deviation of pi and q. That is, the same value of threshold,
β=α=0.3, serves two different purposes: First, for guaranteeing the stability of CRPs
(specified by α) and second, to improve the unreliability caused due to the aging effects
(specified by β). For both cases, CRPs corresponding to total delay-difference, |rN |>α
or β are the same and can be termed as highly stable CRPs.
In the case of modified feed-forward, the performance is quite similar to that of
linear configuration, which is expected. Therefore, the thresholds, α and β (=0.4σ)
are the same. For the case of feed-forward, we observe that the threshold value, β,
required for good reliability is much higher. In this case, β=2.4σ≈1.8=α (for up to 33%
standard deviation of pi) is a desirable choice. In general for a 33% standard deviation
of pi and q, threshold values of 0.8σ, 0.8σ and 2.4σ are good choices for linear, modified
feed-forward and feed-forward configurations, respectively.
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The thresholds, β, chosen previously correspond to the cases when the tolerance to
error in authentication is very low (close to 0%). However in practical authentication
scenarios, we can tolerate a certain amount of error in the responses. For example,
prior work in [7] considers a tolerance of 10 bits for a 128-bit response. Fig. 3.9 shows
thresholds, β, corresponding to a tolerance level, τ , of about 1.5%. This corresponds
to a succesful authentication of 98.5%. As can be observed for linear configuration,
threshold β∗16.67 is much less than 0.4σ = 0.3 obtained for the low tolerance scenario.
This is true for the other configurations as well. Hence, in a practical authentication
scenario, thresholds lower than 0.8σ, 0.8σ and 2.4σ are good enough for maintaining
the required level of reliability for the three configurations. Furthermore, the threshold,
β, vs percentage successful authentication (or % error) curve in Fig. 3.9 can be learnt
using a polynomial fit of order 3 or more.
3.8 Discussion
We observed from our results that the reliability (or intra-chip variation) of a PUF
decreases with aging. The effect of aging on other metrics can be summarized below:
• Uniqueness: Also called inter-chip variation, is the ability of a PUF to produce
outputs that are significantly different from other PUFs. From our simulations
of synthesized PUFs, we observe that for at least 70% permutation of the chips,
uniqueness increases with aging. This is intuitive because of the fact that aging
is a random process due to its Gaussian nature.
• Randomness: It is the ability of a PUF to produce unbiased ‘0’ and ‘1’ response
bits. From Fig. 3.6, we observed that even for an un-aged PUF, the response is
slightly skewed towards bit ‘1’ due to positive arbiter delay. Furthermore, with
aging as observed the number of bit flips from Stable-0→1 is much higher than
Stable-1→0. This further reduces the randomness present in the PUF output.
For countering the unreliability in the stable CRPs due to aging, we suggested an
approach to tune a threshold, β, based on the total delay-difference, rN . An un-aged
PUF has about 85-90% stable CRPs (Fig. 6.2). That is, for a 32-bit un-aged PUF,
we have more than 231 stable CRPs. However with aging, the number of stable CRPs
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decreases (Fig. 3.6). With the threshold tuning method, the number of stable CRPs
depends on the choice of threshold, β. For values of β equal to 0.8σ, 0.8σ and 2.4σ for
linear, modified feed-forward and feed-forward configurations, we get about 42%, 42%
and 2% stable CRPs, respectively. This corresponds to about 231, 231 and 226 number of
stable CRPs. For a practical authentication scenario, these numbers are still considered
significant.
3.9 Conclusion
This work discusses the impact of aging on linear and non-linear MUX PUF configura-
tions. We observe that certain structures (like feed-forward) are much more significantly
affected by aging than the others. We also observed that the arbiter can largely dictate
how a MUX PUF performs with time. Also, under equal aging scenario of delay chain
and arbiter, the effects of aging are similar to that of noise. However, under unequal
aging scenario, the degradation due to aging is much more significant than noise. Ap-
proaches to improve the reliability by estimating new model parameters or by tuning
a threshold based on the total delay-difference were discussed. The threshold depends
on the amount of error that can be tolerated in the authentication scheme. It was
further observed that the authentication accuracy of feed-forward PUFs is degraded by
3% if the number of MUX stages increases from 32 to 64 under equal aging scenario.
Furthermore, the effect of arbiter aging due to asymmetry is lessened as the number of
MUX stages increases.
Chapter 4
Entropy based analysis of MUX
PUF
4.1 Introduction
In this work, we consider the same three MUX PUF configurations: linear, feed-forward
and modified feed-forward as shown in Figs. 2.1, 2.2. We discussed that a simple MUX
PUF is linear in nature because its response can be computed using a linear delay
model. They act as the backbone for more complex configurations such as feed-forward
and modified feed-forward. The feed-forward and modified feed-forward configurations
(shown in Fig. 2.2) have intermediate arbiter(s) making the structure nonlinear in na-
ture. The external challenge bits corresponding to the MUXes controlled by the output
of internal arbiters are unused. For example, in the modified feed-forward configura-
tion, the external challenge bits at stages N2 and N2+1 are unused. There exist more
complex feed-forward based structures like overlap, cascade and separate as shown in
Fig. 4.1 that contain different arrangements of internal arbiters [11].
In this work [19], we propose a novel approach based on Shannon entropy to deter-
mine whether a given MUX PUF is linear or not. The approach exploits the fact that a
nonlinear MUX PUF has at least one internally generated challenge bit. This observa-
tion is valid for logic-reconfigurable MUX PUFs like feed-forward and MUX/DeMUX
topologies [11]. The approach can also be extended to other types of non-linear MUX
PUFs like XOR-arbiter or lightweight PUFs [7, 52, 53]. The analysis described in this
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Fig. 4.1: Variants of feed-forward structures: (top) overlap, (middle) cascade, (bottom) separate
work, however, focuses on feed-forward based configurations.
In [31, 54], entropy based metrics for evaluating the unpredictability of a PUF was
discussed. The method requires a tester to have access to PUF responses of certain
predefined challenges. The challenge set consists of a set of randomly chosen challenges
along with their k-bit neighbors. Conditional entropy is then computed by considering
the response to a random challenge and challenges that are its k-bit neighbors. Our
work adopts a modified version of the approach for determining non-linearity in a MUX
PUF. We compute the conditional entropy of response with respect to its 1-bit neighbors
that correspond to each stage of the MUX PUF. The entropy measure in this case will
indicate the amount of information conveyed by each MUX stage. This will then help us
determine the stages that are controlled by the internally generated challenge bits. For
example, we can determine the location of N2 and N2+1 in case of modified feed-forward
configuration.
4.2 Unpredictability and Mutual Information
In the PUF literature, there are various evaluation metrics that are used to analyze
the performance of PUFs. One such metric is unpredictability [55] which gives us an
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indication about the security of a PUF. Given the knowledge of a set of CRPs, it
measures the ease with which one can predict the response to a given challenge. Higher
the unpredictability, more difficult it is to the predict the response.
One of the approaches used to measure unpredictability is by computing the entropy
[31, 54] associated with CRPs. Min-entropy and Shannon entropy based metrics can be
used for this purpose [56]. Min-entropy indicates how many bits in the PUF response
are uniformly random, whereas Shannon entropy corresponds to an average measure of
randomness. Therefore, to measure unpredictability for the overall CRP set, Shannon
entropy is more suitable. More specifically, the approach used in this paper is based on
conditional Shannon entropy.
We know that conditional entropy given by H(X|Y ) is another way of measuring
mutual information, I(X,Y ), between two variables X and Y . They are related as
I(X,Y ) = H(X)−H(X|Y ). For our purposes, we will assume X and Y to be PUF re-
sponses to two different challenges. Mutual information, I(X,Y ), measures the amount
of information the knowledge of response Y indicates about response X and vice versa.
For a highly secure PUF, we desire I(X,Y )=0. This corresponds to the case when X
and Y are independent of each other. For a MUX PUF, responses X and Y can take
values as bit 0 or 1. That is, the cardinality of X and Y , |X|=|Y | is 2. Therefore,
H(X|Y ) ≤ H(X) ≤ log2(|X|) = 1.
4.3 Entropy based method
This section briefly describes the entropy based approach adopted from [31]. The aim
is to compute H(X|Y ) using the responses collected for a predefined set of CRPs.
Let us assume that X corresponds to the response to challenge Cx and Y to Cy.
Challenge Cx is chosen at random, whereas Cy is chosen such that the Hamming distance
between them, HD(Cx, Cy), is 1 bit. Each Cx will have N 1-bit neighbors Cy, where
N is the number of bits in the challenge. Conditional entropy between two random
variables X and Y is defined by:
H(X|Y ) = −
∑
(x∈X,y∈Y )
p(x, y) log2
(
p(x, y)
p(y)
)
(4.1)
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For our purposes, X and Y are the PUF responses corresponding to (Cx,Cy) pair. For
an N -bit MUX PUF, we follow the following procedure to compute the entropy values:
• Create the challenge space consisting of (Cx,Cy) pairs. This is done by first choos-
ing a random set of challenges as Cx. Then, for each Cx, we select N challenges,
Cy, that are 1-bit apart, i.e., HD(Cx, Cy)=1 bit.
• Obtain PUF responses X and Y corresponding to each (Cx,Cy) pair.
• Compute entropy as in (4.1) by considering only one of the N (Cx,Cy) pairs at a
time. For instance, consider (Cx,Cy) pairs with 1-bit difference at the n
th stage,
where n can be between 1 and N . That is for an N -stage PUF, we can compute
N such conditional entropies, H(X|Y ). Each such H(X|Y ) can be termed as
bit-wise entropy corresponding to the nth stage.
Conditional entropy in (4.1) involves computation of joint probability p(x, y) and
marginal probability p(y). For our specific case, they can be computed as follows:
• Conditional entropy corresponds to responses X and Y for challenges that are
1-bit apart at an nth stage. Therefore, the summation in the computation of
H(X|Y ) is over unique pairs of responses, (X = x, Y = y). As x and y are 1-bit
values, only four such unique combinations are possible.
• p(x, y) = #(x,y)T , where #(x, y) is the number of instances of (x, y) and T is the
total number of random challenges, Cx.
• Similarly, p(y)=#yT , where #y is the number of instances of y.
4.4 Data Setup for Entropy analysis
We experimented the proposed approach on 9 PUFs that are fabricated across 2 chips.
For the entropy-based analysis, we need to generate a new challenge space rather than
use a set of random challenges. The generated challenge space consists of 1000 random
challenges and their 1-bit neighbors. For a 32-bit MUX PUF (discussed in Section 2.5),
a random challenge can have 32 1-bit neighbors. This makes the total size of challenge
set as 1000×(1+32)=33,000 challenges.
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As discussed in Section 2.5.1, we use a soft-response based chip in our lab. For
the proposed approach, we use challenges (or CRPs) that are stable, i.e., whose soft-
response values, Rs, are greater than 0.9 or less than 0.1. All the other challenges
that are unstable are discarded. This is done so because the final response bit to these
(unstable) challenges after 0.1-0.9 thresholding is unreliable and therefore, would result
in an inaccurate computation of entropy.
4.5 Bit-wise Entropy results
Conditional Shannon entropy is computed as in (4.1) by using the CRPs collected for
predefined set of challenges. We collect responses to 1000 random challenges and their
1-bit neighbors. For a 32-bit MUX PUF, each random challenge, Cx, has 32 neighbors,
Cy, such that HD(Cx, Cy)=1. That is, during the computation of bit-wise or conditional
entropy we will obtain 32 different values corresponding to the stages of MUX PUF.
Figs. 4.2 and 4.3 show the bit-wise entropy plot for linear and non-linear MUX PUFs,
respectively.
Fig. 4.2: Bit-wise entropy for linear or standard PUF with 1000 random stable challenges
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Fig. 4.3: Bit-wise entropy for feed-forward and modified feed-forward PUF configurations with
1000 random stable challenges
The entropy plots of non-linear MUX PUF have a distinctive feature. In the case of
modified feed-forward configuration, we observe zero bit-wise entropy at stages N2=26
and N2+1=27 and for the feed-forward configuration, we observe zero entropy value at
stage N2=26. In both these cases, the zeros in the entropy plot correspond to the MUX
stages being controlled by the internally generated challenge bits. Entropy H(X|Y )
being zero indicates that the mutual information, I(X,Y ), corresponding to these stages
is very high, i.e., equal to 1. This is because I(X,Y ) = H(X)− 0 = log2(2) = 1. H(X)
takes the maximum value of 1, because the challenges, Cx, are selected at random and
therefore, p(X)≈0.5.
A higher value of bit-wise entropy corresponds to a higher degree of randomness or
security for those MUX stages. In other words, certain MUX stages contribute more
towards the security of the PUF than others. In general, we observe a higher value of
entropy corresponding to the middle stages of the PUF.
In Figs. 4.2 and 4.3, we have used 1000 random challenges for computing the
conditional entropy. However in our experiments, we observed that for obtaining a
‘good’ bit-wise entropy curve, we do not actually need these many random challenges.
In Fig. 4.4, we show that about 50 random challenges (and its 1-bit neighbors, therefore
a total of 50*33=1650 instead of 1000*33=33,000 challenges) are sufficient to compute an
accurate value of bit-wise entropy. The observations are consistent across different tested
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Fig. 4.4: Bit-wise entropy for linear, feed-forward and modified feed-forward PUF configurations
with 50 random stable challenges
PUFs. Therefore, we claim a 100% sensitivity and 100% specificity for determining non-
linearity in these PUFs.
In Fig. 4.5, we show bit-wise entropy curves obtained for feed-forward configurations
with two arbiters, namely, overlap, cascade and separate feed-forward structures (shown
in Fig. 4.1). These PUFs are synthesized in software using the additive linear delay
model explained in Section 2.2. In the model, delay-difference values are sampled from
the probability distribution functions (pdf) obtained from the chips [5]. These PUFs
also contain 32 MUX stages, and are configured as follows: (i) Overlap - 1st arbiter
between stages 9 and 20, 2nd arbiter between stages 16 and 25; (ii) Cascade - 1st arbiter
between stages 9 and 15, 2nd arbiter between stages 16 and 25; (iii) Separate - 1st arbiter
between stages 9 and 15, 2nd arbiter between stages 20 and 25.
4.6 Discussion
In previous sections, we have shown that by using the entropy based approach, one can
determine whether a MUX PUF is linear or non-linear. The zero entropy values in the
plot correspond to the MUX stage(s) or bit(s) that is unused in a challenge. That is,
responses X and Y to challenge pair (Cx,Cy), Cy being a 1-bit neighbor to the random
challenge Cx at a particular MUX stage, will be the same. (X = x, Y = y) can take
values as either (0,0) or (1,1) and therefore, p(X = x|Y = y)=1. This results in zero
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Fig. 4.5: Bit-wise entropy for synthesized feed-forward structures: overlap, cascade and separate
with 50 random stable challenges.
entropy at these stages.
Another observation of interest is the number of zeros in the entropy plot. The
number of zeros gives an upper bound on the number of internal arbiters present in
a non-linear MUX PUF. As an example, if there are K zeros in the plot, one can say
that the number of internal arbiters is anywhere between 1 and K. In a sense, this
gives away crucial information about the internal structure of the PUF. Therefore, by
using such an approach it is possible for an attacker to reverse engineer non-linear based
MUX PUFs. Another observation of interest for an attacker might be that certain MUX
stages (corresponding to ones with higher entropies) are more critical for predicting the
responses. These stages are critical because they convey much less information about
output than the others. Such an information theoretic approach is important for the
hardware security analysis of various MUX based PUFs.
In this work, we have mainly focused on feed-forward based configurations. Nonethe-
less, the discussed approaches are also valid for other MUX PUF configurations like
MUX/DeMUX or XOR-arbiter PUFs. For MUX/DeMUX PUFs, the approach will
help determine the position of stages with select signal. For XOR-arbiter PUFs, the
approach will help determine the MUX stages where challenge bits are internally gener-
ated across different PUFs. The entropy based approach can also be easily extended for
analysis of more secure PUF configurations with higher bit-widths like 64 or 128 MUX
stages. Such approaches have also found relevance in ring-oscillator (RO) PUFs [57].
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4.7 Conclusion
In this work, we have proposed an entropy based test to determine whether a MUX
PUF is linear or non-linear. Based on the analysis, we can obtain an upper bound on
the number of internal arbiters present in a non-linear MUX PUF. The approach has
significance in reverse engineering applications and in determining the security aspects
of a PUF. From an information theoretic perspective, we can determine the MUX stages
that contribute more to the security of a PUF.
Chapter 5
Predicting Soft-Response of
MUX PUFs via Logistic
Regression of Total
Delay-Difference
5.1 Introduction
In previous chapters, we discussed about the linear delay model used to model MUX
based PUFs. In Section 2.2, we used the model to compute the total delay-difference,
rN , of the delay chain consisting of N multiplexer stages and an arbiter at the end. The
arbiter is modelled using its propagation delay and a sign response curve that decides
the final response bit to be bit ‘0’ or ‘1’. Furthermore in Section 2.2.2, we discussed how
the PUF response can also be viewed as a soft-response instead of a hard-response. This
work discusses models that can be used to compute soft-response to a given challenge
for MUX PUFs.
In prior works [6, 20, 28], approaches based on artificial neural network (ANN)
models have been proposed to predict the soft-responses from input challenges. Even
though these models are able to classify and predict the responses with sufficiently high
accuracy, they suffer from large computational complexity. In our proposed framework,
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the model of the PUF is assumed to be stored in the server. The server then determines
whether the challenge is stable or not by computing the soft response. However, com-
puting thousands of ANN model parameters is not desirable due to significant area and
power consumption. In this work [58], we propose a simple logistic regression based ap-
proach where the model parameters (which are the delay-differences of MUX stage and
arbiter delay) and 3 other parameters are stored in the server. The logistic regression
is used to learn the 3 parameters from chip data. We consider logistic function of the
form:
F (x) =
F∞
1 + e−k(x−x0)
(5.1)
where x is the independent variable, x0 is the threshold, k is the flatness parameter and
the dependent variable, F (.), is the soft-response. In our model, x corresponds to total
delay-difference, rN and can be computed using the delay parameters of the MUX PUF.
Learning the logistic (or sigmoid) function in (5.1) involves estimating parameters F∞,
k and x0.
5.2 Response curve
In Section 2.2, we discussed about the sign response curve (2.2) used to obtain the final
response bit, R. As per the response curve, the response bit is ‘1’ if the total delay-
difference, rN , is positive and ‘0’ if it is negative. Fig. 5.1 shows the sign(.) response
function whose output is a hard-response.
In Section 2.2.2, we discussed about the effects of metastability and environmental
noise. Due to environmental noise, the delay parameters of the multiplexers and arbiter
vary as shown in (2.3). Furthermore due to metastability, the final response bits can
vary on multiple measurements. The combined effect is represented in terms of a soft-
response.
5.2.1 Sigmoid response curve
We discussed in previous chapters that the delay parameters like delay-difference of the
multiplexers and the arbiter delay can be estimated using an LMS based method [5].
These estimated parameters are assumed to be stored in the server database. The value
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Fig. 5.1: Sign response curve for incorporating the output as hard-response
Fig. 5.2: Plot of soft-response, Rs and total delay-difference, rN as obtained from silicon chip
and fitting a sigmoid function (solid line) to the result with k=16.
of total delay-difference, rN , can then be computed using (2.1).
Fig. 5.2 shows the plot of soft-response obtained from the chip for a linear MUX
PUF against total delay-difference, rN , computed in the server. Note that the computed
value of total delay-difference, rN , does not include the effects of noise and metastability.
In the figure, CRPs that are stable-0, stable-1 and unstable according to the 0.1-0.9
threshold (from ground truth) are shown using different colors. The solid line in the
plot shows the sigmoid or logistic fit to the chip data.
Fig. 5.3 shows the plot of soft-response for non-linear MUX PUF configurations.
The estimated parameters of the sigmoid function for the three configurations are shown
in Table 6.2. The table shows the result for PUFs in two different chips, denoted as
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Fig. 5.3: Plot of soft-response, Rs, and total delay-difference, rN , as obtained from silicon chip
for (left) modified feed-forward and (right) feed-forward configurations. The sigmoid function
fits lead to k=15.75 and 15, respectively.
Table 5.1: Logistic regression parameters for learning the response curves for different PUF
configurations with 10,000 challenges
PUF configs k F∞ x0
PUF-1 15.997 1.001 -0.0165
Linear PUF-2 19.377 1.002 -0.0087
PUF-1 15.773 1.001 -0.0244
MFF PUF-2 19.160 1.000 -0.0186
PUF-1 15.032 0.983 -0.0344
FF PUF-2 18.921 0.988 -0.0257
PUF-1 and PUF-2. It is important to note that in case of feed-forward configuration,
the value of k obtained by the fit is skewed by the noisy observations. The value of k
decides the flatness of the response curve and is characteristic of the arbiter and noise
variations in the MUX PUF. Note that if |rN |< 1k , the soft-response takes value between
0.27-0.73. This corresponds to a set of unstable CRPs. For our purposes, however, we
have chosen a much more stringent threshold of 0.1-0.9. Table 5.2 shows 95% confidence
intervals for each of the estimated parameters k, F∞ and x0. We can observe that the
parameters estimated for linear configuration have higher confidence compared to the
other two configurations.
The spread (or noise) in Figs. 5.2 and 5.3 (also seen in Table 5.2) is related to how
much effect the environmental noise or metastability have on the final response bit. In
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Table 5.2: Confidence interval values for the three logistic regression parameters of the form
k ± µ(k), where µ(k) is the 95% confidence interval
PUF configs µ(k) µ(F∞)× 10−5 µ(x0)× 10−5
PUF-1 0.0104 7.187 4.722
Linear PUF-2 0.0142 8.002 4.319
PUF-1 0.0105 7.546 4.831
MFF PUF-2 0.0163 9.322 5.011
PUF-1 0.0244 18.52 12.44
FF PUF-2 0.0324 18.36 10.20
case of linear configuration, the spread is much less and can be seen in the form of a
thick line around the logistic fit. However in the case of feed-forward configuration, the
spread is much more significant due to an increased effect of metastability and noise on
the final response bit [26]. Whenever the challenge bit at N2 flips (Fig. 2.2), it may
cause the final response bit to flip as well if rN was already close to 0. However, in
case of modified feed-forward, the interconnections in its structure, i.e., N2 and N2 + 1,
almost nullify the effect of the intermediate stage. Therefore, its parameter values and
their confidence intervals are similar to that of linear configuration.
Using the estimated parameters for the logistic function, we can now compute the
predicted soft-responses. Table 5.3 shows the prediction accuracy of the logistic func-
tion. For a given challenge and stage delay-differences, we can obtain the total delay-
difference, rN , using (2.1). The soft-response value is then computed using the logistic
function and compared against the threshold 0.1-0.9 for determining whether it is stable
or not. The last column in the table shows the precision for the classification of CRPs
as stable or unstable. Precision is the percentage of stable CRPs correctly predicted by
the function. We will discuss this using two examples. In the case of linear PUF-1, the
confusion matrix is as shown below:
Predicted
Stable Unstable
Actual
Stable 8620 357 8977
Unstable 114 909
8734
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Table 5.3: Comparison of number of stable CRPs obtained from the ground truth and prediction;
and percentage of stable CRPs which were correctly predicted (precision) by the logistic function
PUF configs No. of Stable CRPs
Predicted
No. of Stable CRPs % Stable
PUF-1 8977 8734 98.69%
Linear PUF-2 9174 8980 98.59%
PUF-1 8917 8639 98.55%
MFF PUF-2 9129 8953 98.06%
PUF-1 8451 8511 94.05%
FF PUF-2 8832 8958 95.01%
We can observe that sensitivity = 86208620+357=96%, specificity =
909
909+114=89%, pre-
cision = 86208620+114=98.69%. Sensitivity and specificity measure the proportion of stable
and unstable CRPs, respectively, that are correctly identified as such. In case of feed-
forward PUF-2, the confusion matrix is shown below:
Predicted
Stable Unstable
Actual
Stable 8511 721 8832
Unstable 447 321
8958
We observe that sensitivity=96.4%, specificity=42%, precision=95.01%. We observe
that the sensitivity and precision of feed-forward configuration are comparable to that
of linear. However, specificity of feed-forward is significantly worse than that of linear
configuration.
5.3 Discussion
In previous sections, we used logistic regression to learn the relation between soft-
response, Rs, and total delay-difference, rN . From the results in Table 6.2, we observe
that two parameters of the logistic function, F∞ and x0 are almost equal to 1 and 0,
respectively. Therefore, the response curve can be expressed simply in terms of the
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Fig. 5.4: The effect of change in arbiter delay parameters: change in ∆arb shifts the response
curve with k=1; change in Tsetup or Thold flattens the response curve
parameter k:
Rs = F (rN ) ≈ 1
1 + e−krN
(5.2)
It seems possible to calculate the value of k from arbiter’s timing parameters, Tsetup,
Thold and noise variations in the PUF due to their inverse relation. This is because the
response curve (characterized by k) essentially has the same functionality as cumulative
distribution function (cdf) of a Gaussian random variable modelled by total delay-
difference, rN . This would reduce the training effort needed to learn the logistic function.
Another application of the proposed function for the response curve is to study the
effect of aging in MUX PUFs discussed in Chapter 3. Due to aging, the hardware delay
parameters like ∆arb, Tsetup and Thold gradually increase. Any change in arbiter delay,
∆arb, shifts the response curve to right (value of x0 increases) and change in Tsetup or
Thold flattens the response curve (value of k decreases). These effects are shown in Fig.
5.4.
5.4 Conclusion
This paper has demonstrated that soft response can be obtained from a hard PUF
using logistic regression. The logistic regression function has been trained using the
experimental chip data obtained from a soft PUF [28].
Chapter 6
Bit-Flipping Algorithm to convert
Unstable to Stable Challenges
6.1 Introduction
This chapter considers the scenario where the server stores model parameters, as op-
posed to challenge-response pairs in a look-up table (LUT). These model parameters
correspond to the delay-difference of MUX stages and arbiter delay. As discussed earlier,
they can estimated by using adaptive learning techniques as in [5]. However, certain
challenges do not always output the same response. That is, they have variations in
their responses. These CRPs are referred to as unstable. Before the server issues a
challenge for authentication, it needs to ensure that the chosen challenge is stable. To
determine whether a challenge is stable or not, we make use of total delay-difference as
a metric [41]. This metric can be computed based on the stored model parameters. The
stability of a challenge is decided based on a threshold on total delay-difference. If the
challenge is not stable, the server can then either discard and issue a new random chal-
lenge, or modify the unstable challenge to a stable one by flipping few bits. In this work,
we propose a bit-flipping algorithm for the latter approach in case of three MUX PUF
configurations: linear, feed-forward and modified feed-forward [11]. The algorithm de-
termines the minimum number of bits that should be flipped, so that the new challenge
is guaranteed to be stable. Furthermore, we compare the computational complexity of
the proposed algorithm to the straightforward approach based on discarding unstable
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challenges.
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Fig. 6.1: Example showing two possible bit-flipping approaches for an 8-bit linear PUF. Thresh-
old on magnitude of total delay-difference is 0.6. Red color indicates an unstable response, and
green indicates stable response. Approach II is proposed in this paper: 1 XOR bit-flip leads to
2 bit-flips in the final challenge.
The key contributions of this work include: an approach to transform an unstable
challenge to a stable one by flipping only a few bits and analysis of computational
complexities involved with the approach compared to the straightforward approach.
Fig. 6.1 illustrates the effect of flipping a bit in XOR-ed challenge, and its effect on the
total delay-difference and the stability of the response. While it may seem that flipping
bit corresponding to highest magnitude of delay-difference is a good strategy, we show
that this is not always the case. Such an example is shown in Approach I where the
response is unstable. Approach II shows our proposed approach. In the example, the
proposed approach selects bit-4 for flipping instead of bit-5 as in the case of Approach
I. We will explore how these stages are selected in next sections. Furthermore, we also
show that the proposed approach has much better worst-case and slightly better average-
case performance in terms of the number of addition operations than the straightforward
method.
6.2 Total Delay-Difference based thresholding
Fig. 6.2 shows the probability distribution of total delay-difference, rN , obtained using
the model in (2.3). Non-linear configurations are assumed to have N1=16, and N2=26
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Fig. 6.2: Histogram of total delay-difference, rN , obtained from synthesized models using 10,000
challenges for (left to right) linear, modified feed-forward and feed-forward configurations. Noise
has std. equal to 10% std. of delay-difference, ∆i.
for a 32-bit MUX PUF. The model parameters, ∆i, used for computing rN are sampled
from Gaussian distributions with a variance of 0.02 [5]. The CRPs are classified as
stable or unstable by using the model in (2.3). We assume the noise standard deviation
to be 10% of standard deviation of delay-difference, ∆i. We chose a threshold of 0.1-0.9
for the classification. This means that if the soft-response is greater than 0.9 or less
than 0.1, the response is considered stable, otherwise it is considered to be unstable.
From the distribution, we can observe that feed-forward configuration has a higher
spread of unstable CRPs compared to the other two configurations. For the threshold
0.1-0.9, we observe that the percentage of stable CRPs for linear or modified feed-
forward configuration is about 89-90% compared to about 85% for the feed-forward
configuration. Therefore, about 10-15% of random challenges are unstable.
6.2.1 Authentication Scheme
In a typical PUF authentication scheme, there are two main phases: enrollment and
authentication. In the enrollment phase, thousands of reference CRPs are measured
and stored in the server. In the authentication scheme, the user is granted access
if the chip responses to the chosen challenges match with those stored in the LUT
(computed using a Hamming distance). However, due to variations in the response, all
the responses might not match with the reference set [41]. Hence, we define an error
tolerance or threshold corresponding to an acceptable amount of mismatch between the
responses [7, 28]. An example is discussed in [7], where an error tolerance of 10 out
of 128 bits is used. This corresponds to about 7.8% error in the responses. But as
discussed previously, about 10-15% of random challenges can be unstable. Therefore,
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the Hamming distance between the responses can be lower than that required for a
successful authentication as the percentage of unstable challenges is higher than the
error tolerance. This will result in a false negative scenario, where a legitimate user
fails to be authenticated. Therefore, there is a necessity to ensure that the chosen set
of challenges are stable.
The model parameter based authentication scheme requires computation of total
delay-difference, rN , as a metric instead of soft-response. The server, therefore, requires
additional resources for storing the model parameters and for the computation of rN
metric described in (2.1). The computation of rN is essentially N + 1 add operations.
Furthermore, this scheme only requires storage for theN+1 model parameters compared
to thousands of CRPs in the previous method. The model parameters can be stored in
the server by using a fixed-point representation. The word-length for the representation
will depend on the precision required for the computations. Nonetheless, the word-
length will be much less than N + 1, as in the case of a CRP LUT.
6.2.2 Thresholding Total Delay-Difference
Just like soft-response (with threshold 0.1-0.9), total delay-difference, rN , also needs to
be thresholded for the classification of CRPs as stable or unstable. The threshold decides
whether a challenge drawn at random by the server is likely to be stable or not. Fig.
6.2 shows how thresholds, α, can be empirically chosen. The aim is to choose a value
of rN that guarantees the stability of CRPs. A good example is a value greater than
three-sigma of unstable CRPs. As shown in figure, we choose thresholds of 0.4σ, 0.4σ
and 2.4σ for linear, modified feed-forward and feed-forward configurations, respectively
[41]. Here, σ is the standard deviation of the overall total delay-difference, rN . After
thresholding, if the challenge turns out to be unstable, the server can then either draw
a new challenge and test again, or attempt to flip few bits according to the bit-flipping
algorithm described in later section.
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6.3 Software model, Algorithm and Results
6.3.1 Software Model
We analyze our proposed methodology using 6 synthesized MUX PUFs. We consider
the three PUF configurations, namely linear, feed-forward and modified feed-forward.
The PUFs are assumed to have 32 MUX stages. The delay-difference of MUX stages
and arbiter delay are sampled from Gaussian distributions [5]. PUF synthesis is done
in software using the linear delay model described in (2.1), (2.2). In next sections, we
will the discuss the straightforward and bit-flipping approaches.
6.3.2 Straightforward Approach: Discarding Unstable CRPs
For the three configurations, we discussed the thresholds, α, on rN required to guarantee
the stability of CRPs. That is, a CRP is considered stable if |rN | ≥ α. An unstable
challenge according to the threshold, α, is discarded and a new one is issued and tested
for stability. However, it is possible, though unlikely, that a new issued challenge is
always unstable. This is the worst-case scenario, where the number of computations
required is infinity. The best-case scenario happens when the first issued challenge is
stable. We will denote the number of computations required for the expression |rN | ≥ α
as t. For a linear PUF, t = N + 2 add operations. This is because rN requires N + 1
computations and the comparison can be considered as an add operation. Hence, the
best case requires t operations. For the average-case analysis, we need to consider
the probability of a random challenge being stable. We will denote this probability as
p. As discussed earlier, p can take values between 0.85-0.9 depending on the PUF
configuration. The number of computations can thus, be expressed as pt+ p(1− p)2t+
p(1 − p)23t + ...= tp . For every new challenge, total delay-difference, rN , needs to be
computed and therefore, requires t add operations for each attempt. However, the
number of attempts is not bounded and therefore, n can go up to infinity.
6.3.3 Bit-flipping Approach: Converting Unstable to Stable
In this section, we discuss the algorithm used to convert a likely unstable challenge to
stable one. The idea is to increase the magnitude of total delay-difference, rN , to be
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Algorithm 1 Linear PUFs: Algorithm for mapping challenge, C, to its closest stable one, Cf
σ ← standard deviation of rN distribution
α← 0.4σ, threshold
∆i ← delay-difference per stage
J ← Pre-computed set of size s based on the sign of total delay-difference, rN
C′ ← [C′1, C′2, ..C′i.., C′N ], input XOR challenge
Cf ← [C1, C2, ..Cj .., CN ], new challenge
1: if
∑N+1
i=1
∣∣∆i∣∣ ≥ α then
2: Compute rN
3: Choose bits {j} ∈ J
4: for 1 : s do
5: if |rN | < α then break;
6: flip bit C′j
7: Compute rN
8: Cj ← C′j ⊕ C′j+1
9: else
EXIT. Conversion not possible when the delay differences, ∆i, are very small.
greater than threshold, α. We achieve this by flipping minimal number of bits in the
original challenge.
There are many possible solutions for the bit-flipping approach. Fig. 6.1 shows
two such approaches. Approach I considers the bit-flip in the position corresponding
to highest magnitude of delay-difference, ∆i. A bit-flip at position i changes the value
of previously computed total delay-difference, rN , by 2∆
i. In the example shown in
Fig. 6.1, the bit-flip at the 5th stage changes the previous value of rN from 0.5 to -0.5.
However, the value is still less than the threshold of 0.6, thus, deeming the new challenge
as unstable.
We suggest an Approach II, where the bit-flips are allowed only at certain stages.
Algorithm 1 shows the proposed approach for a linear PUF. Bits to be flipped are
identified based on the sign of total delay-difference, rN . Remember from (2.1) that rN
depends on the sum of factors, rN (i) = (−1)C′i∆i. That is, rN =
∑N
i=1 rN (i) + ∆
arb.
If the sign of rN is positive, we choose set of bit locations i corresponding to negative
values of rN (i) and vice versa. In addition, these bit locations are stored according to
decreasing order of magnitude of delay-difference, rN (i). We will denote the set storing
these bit locations as J which has a size of s. For example, set J for Fig. 6.1 contains
entries [4, 3, 8, 1] of size s = 4. The number of iterations in the algorithm is limited by
the size, s, which usually averages N/2 for an N -bit MUX PUF. Therefore, s is also the
maximum number of possible bit-flips in C ′.
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Fig. 6.3: Relation between C and C’ for a linear configuration
Fig. 6.3 shows the relation between a challenge, C, and its XOR-ed challenge, C ′.
For linear MUX PUFs, there exists a one-to-one mapping between C and C ′ specified
by the XOR operation. Note that we flip the bits in XOR-ed challenge, C ′, rather than
C itself. One bit flip in C ′ will result in two bit-flips in C, as Ci = C ′i ⊕ C ′i+1 and the
XOR operation is commutative in nature.
In the proposed method, the computation of rN in each iteration involves just 3
additions and 1 bit-shift operation. Shift operation is due to the factor 2∆i that gets
added to the previously computed value of rN . 3 add operations are due to the bit-flip,
addition of 2∆i factor and comparison with threshold, α. In comparison, straightforward
approach requires t add operations in each iteration because of a new random challenge.
In the unlikely scenario, the sum of the magnitudes of delay-difference does not
exceed the threshold, i.e.,
∑N+1
i=1
∣∣∆i∣∣<α, the bit-flipping logic would not help. This can
only happen when a PUF has very small delay-differences, ∆i, or the threshold, α, is
too large. The worst-case scenario happens when either a stable challenge is found in
the sth (or last) attempt or when the bit-flipping logic fails as mentioned. The number
of computations in this case is t + 3s additions and s shift operations. Unlike the
straightforward approach, the worst-case computation is not infinite. For the best-case
scenario when stable challenge is found in the first attempt, the bit-flipping algorithm
is not needed and therefore, the computation is just t add operations. However, the
number of computations for average-case scenario is slightly different. After a bit-flip,
the new challenge cannot be considered as random and is more probable to be stable,
say, with a probability of p1, where p1 > p. For example, the average number of add
operations for the second attempt is p1(1 − p)(t + 3). However, for our computations,
we assume that p1 ≈ p and therefore, can be expressed as pt + p(1 − p)(t + 3) + p(1 −
p)2(t+ 6) + ...+ p(1− p)s(t+ 3s)=t[1− (1− p)s+1]+3(1−p)p [1− (1− p)s(1 + ps)]. We can
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simplify this further by assuming nominal values of p and s. For a high value of p and
s ≈ 16 (=N/2), it is approx. equal to t+ 3(1−p)p . The number of shift operations is given
by 0 + p(1− p)1 + p(1− p)2(2) + ...+ p(1− p)2s=1−pp [1− (1− p)s(1 + ps)]≈1−pp . Table
6.1 shows the comparison of computational complexities between the two approaches.
Note that extra computations are required for computing XOR-ed challenge, C ′,
from the original challenge, C, in (2.1) and to compute the new challenge, Cf , from
flipped version of XOR-ed challenge, C ′. For an N -bit PUF, one may implement the
former by using the relation C ′i = C
′
i+1⊕Ci, which requires N additions. This conversion
is required for both the approaches. However, the latter conversion from C ′ to Cf is
only required for the bit-flipping approach. This can be done by using the relation
Ci = C
′
i ⊕ C ′i+1. A flip in bit C ′i affects Ci and Ci+1. Therefore, the conversion needs
two add operations for every bit-flip. This conversion from C ′ to Cf is not included
inside the loop in algorithm because of one-to-one mapping between C and C ′. However,
we will discuss that this is not the case for non-linear PUF configurations.
The approach for bit-flipping in the case of feed-forward and modified feed-forward
is similar to Algorithm 1. However, it is slightly more involved due to the presence of
internal arbiter. Note that in the case of feed-forward, challenge bits at N2 cannot be
flipped as they are internally generated. Therefore, the set J cannot contain the stage
N2 as possible choice for bit-flipping. This means that due to the existence of loop
from N1 to N2, XOR-ed challenge bits of C
′ are not only dependent on the challenge
bits of C, but also dependent on the internal challenge bit at N2 computed using the
delay-differences from stages 1 to N1. Depending on the location of bit-flip in C
′, it can
also affect the computation of internal challenge bit and therefore, result in two bit-flips
in C ′. This requires the total delay-difference at stage N2, rN2 , to be computed inside
the loop. Computation of rN2 requires N1 + 1 add operation. This further increases
Table 6.1: Comparison of computational complexities for a challenge between Straightforward
and Bit-flipping approach.
Straightforward Bit-flipping
best average worst best
average worst
add shift add shift
t t
p
∞ t t+ k1(1−p)
p
k2(1−p)
p
t+ k1s k2s
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Table 6.2: Values of k1 and k2 for computation complexities shown in Table 6.1 for the three
configurations
Configuration t k1 k2
Linear N + 2 3 1
FF N1 +N + 3 ∼ N1 2
Modified FF N1 +N + 3 ∼ N1 3
Algorithm 2 Feed-forward PUFs: Algorithm for mapping challenge, C, to its closest stable
one, Cf
σ ← standard deviation of rN distribution
α← 2.4σ, threshold
∆i ← delay-difference per stage
J ← Pre-computed set of size s based on the sign of total delay-difference, rN
C′ ← [C′1, C′2, ..C′i.., C′N ], input XOR challenge
Cf ← [C1, C2, ..Cj .., CN ], new challenge
1: if
∑N+1
i=1
∣∣∆i∣∣ ≥ α then
2: Compute rN
3: Choose bits {j} ∈ J
4: for 1 : s do
5: if |rN | < α then break;
6: flip bit C′j
7: Compute rN2 (If applicable)
8: Compute rN
9: Cj ← C′j ⊕ C′j+1
10: else
EXIT. Conversion not possible when the delay differences, ∆i, are very small.
the number of computations for each iteration. The exact number of computations
depends on the position of the bit being flipped. However, we can generally express
it in terms of N1. The number of shift operations in each iteration can be either 1 or
2 in case of feed-forward, and 1 or 3 in case of modified feed-forward. We denote the
a constant number of additions and shifts in each iteration as k1 and k2, respectively.
Table 6.1 shows the number of computations required for a challenge. The value of
constants k1 and k2 for the PUF configurations are shown in Table 6.2. The value of
t for computing total delay-difference, rN , and comparing against α is N1 + N + 3 for
both the configurations. Note that the empirically chosen threshold, α, is much higher
(=2.4σ) in case of feed-forward configuration [41]. As discussed before, this is due to a
larger spread in values of rN for unstable challenges, as shown in Fig. 6.2.
We will discuss the bit-flipping approaches shown in Figs. 6.1 (Approach II) and 6.4.
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Fig. 6.4: Example of bit-flipping algorithm for an 8-bit feed-forward PUF with threshold on
total delay-difference=1.8: 2 XOR bit-flips lead to 3 bit-flips in the final challenge
Example: We consider an 8-bit PUF and assume the delay differences, ∆=[0.1,-0.2,-
0.3,0.4,0.5,-0.4,0.3,-0.2], arbiter delay, ∆arb=0.4 and threshold, α=0.6 for linear and 1.8
for feed-forward configuration.
Linear: We consider the input challenge, C=‘01111100’. XOR-ed challenge will be
C ′=‘11010100’. Therefore, rN (i) = [-0.1,0.2,-0.3,-0.4,0.5,0.4,0.3,-0.2]. Using model in
(2.1), computed rN=0.5. As rN is positive, J=[4,3,8,1]. Iteration-1: As |rN |<α, i.e.,
|0.5|<0.6, challenge is unstable and bit-4 in C ′ needs to be flipped. New C ′=‘11000100’
and rN= 1.3. Iteration-2: As |rN |>α, i.e., |1.3|>0.6, exit loop as stable challenge is
obtained. Using relation shown in Fig. 6.3, the new challenge Cf is‘01001100’. Number
of bit-flips in C ′ and C are 1 and 2, respectively.
Feed-forward: Again the same challenge, C=‘01111100’. XOR-ed challenge will
be C ′=‘11010100’. However, the internally generated challenge bit at stage 6 is com-
puted using total delay-difference at N2, rN2 = 0.3. This indicates internal challenge bit
as ‘1’, which is the same as the external bit in this case. Therefore, rN (i) = [-0.1,0.2,-
0.3,-0.4,0.5,0.4,0.3,-0.2]. Using model in (2.1), computed rN=0.5. As rN is positive,
J=[4,3,8,1]. Iteration-1: As |rN |<α, i.e., |0.5|<1.8, challenge is unstable and bit-4 in
C ′ needs to be flipped. New C ′=‘11000100’ and rN= 0.5. Iteration-2: As |rN |<α, i.e.,
|0.5|<1.8, challenge is unstable and bit-3 in C ′ needs to be flipped. New C ′=‘11100100’
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and rN= 1.9. Iteration-2: As |rN |>α, i.e., |1.9|>1.8, exit loop as stable challenge is
obtained. The new challenge Cf is‘00101100’. Number of bit-flips in C
′ and C are 2
and 4, respectively.
Table 6.3: Performance of bit-flipping algorithm for synthesized 32-bit MUX PUFs with 10,000
random challenges
Performance Metrics PUF 1 PUF 2
Uniqueness 100% 100%
%Stability-Before 90.89% 90.7%
%Stability-After 100% 100%
Linear mean XOR bit flips, C ′ 1 1
max XOR bit flips, C ′ 1 1
mean bit flips, C 2 2
max bit flips, C 2 2
Uniqueness 99.98% 99.97%
%Stability-Before 84.28% 85.41%
%Stability-After 99.43% 97.61%
Feed-forward mean XOR bit flips, C ′ 3.27 3.18
max XOR bit flips, C ′ 7 6
mean bit flips, C 6.55 6.38
max bit flips, C 15 13
Uniqueness 100% 100%
%Stability-Before 90.09% 89.57%
%Stability-After 99.93% 99.8%
Modified FF mean XOR bit flips, C ′ 1 1
max XOR bit flips, C ′ 1 1
mean bit flips, C 3.02 3.01
max bit flips, C 4 4
6.3.4 Results
Table 6.3 shows the performance of the bit-flipping approach with 10,000 randomly
chosen challenges. We can evaluate the performance using the following metrics:
• Uniqueness gives an indication of the percentage of unique challenges after the
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Fig. 6.5: Proposed PUF methodology for authentication
mapping. This can be an important security metric. Any value other than 100%
indicates the existence of some many-to-one challenge mapping for the algorithm.
We observe that most of the challenges after the mapping are unique. However,
in case of feed-forward, a higher threshold means lower number of available stable
challenges after the conversion. There are only 2% of challenges above the thresh-
old and therefore, the bit-flipping algorithm may map to some of the challenges
more than once.
• Stability is a key metric of interest in this paper. We observe the percentage of
challenges that are stable before and after the mapping. Before the mapping,
about 10-15% of challenges were unstable. With the proposed approach, we have
drastically reduced the percentage of unstable challenges to less than 1%.
• Bit-flips We observe that in the case of linear and modified feed-forward con-
figuration, we typically need just 1 bit-flip in the XOR-ed challenge, C ′. For
feed-forward, however, we need higher number of bit-flips.
6.4 Discussion
In this section we discuss the implications of our proposed approach. We propose an
architecture shown in Fig. 6.5. The bit-flipping logic can be thought of as a mapping
operation. The mapper is only needed when the total delay-difference, rN , is less than
the threshold, α. For the values of threshold suggested in this paper, the mapper is
used for about 30% of the challenges in case of linear and the modified feed-forward
configurations. For feed-forward, due to its high threshold, it is used for almost 98% of
the challenges. However, we showed that the worst-case computations for the proposed
approach is much better than the naive approach based on discarding unstable chal-
lenges. And the average computations for the approach are slightly better when t > k1.
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This is a valid assumption for MUX PUFs with large number of multiplexers, like 32 or
64-bit PUFs.
In the case of a scenario where the highest delay-difference value is greater than
threshold, i.e., max(|∆i|) > α, one bit-flip in the XOR-ed challenge would guarantee
stability. This is because one bit-flip changes the total delay-difference, rN , value by
2∆i. So, one may also choose the value of threshold just below the highest expected
value of delay-difference. This would reduce the number of iterations.
6.5 Conclusion
This paper has presented a novel bit-flipping approach for authenticating PUF devices
where challenge-response pairs do not need to be stored. In the proposed approach, the
server only needs to store model parameters extracted after the chip is fabricated. These
parameters are further used to compute total delay-difference which is used to decide
the stability of a challenge and if unstable, convert it to a stable one by flipping few
bits. Future work can be directed towards more efficient implementations for different
MUX PUF configurations.
Chapter 7
Conclusion and Future Direction
This thesis presents various approaches for the modelling of MUX-based PUFs. These
are novel approaches based on the statistical analysis of the lab data.
The analysis of the PUF hardware using linear delay model and its extension for
the analysis of the effect of aging are important contributions of this work. Though
the model makes some assumptions, they are justified based on experimental data and
prior works. The aging model can be further extended by including the variations
due to other delay parameters like setup and hold times of the arbiter. Variations
due to all the parameters, i.e, delay chain consisting of the multiplexers, the arbiter
and noise contribute the overall variance of the total delay-difference. This variance is
directly related to the flatness parameter k for the sigmoid function corresponding to
soft-responses. The sigmoid curve can also be used to learn the classification of stable
‘0’ and stable ‘1’ instead of soft-responses. The accuracy of such a model would be
higher than one obtained from all CRPs.
The entropy approach to detect linearity of different PUF configurations can be
further extended to analyze their unpredictability. A higher value of entropy corresponds
to a higher level of security. Futhermore, the appraoch can be used to reverse engineer
MUX based PUFs. The zeros obtained the entropy curve correspond to the location
of internal challenge bit(s) or output of intermediate arbiter(s). However, the stages
corresponding to the input of arbiter is fairly unknown. In case of modified feed-forward
configuration discussed in this work, where inter-connection exists between N2 and
N2 + 1, the location of input of arbiter is not significant for determining the final
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response bit. This makes such configurations more susceptible to attacks.
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